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1 If you would go out on the street and ask people to name a whistleblower most would
probably say “Edward Snowden”. His whistleblowing on governments’ mass surveillance
of  internet  and phone communication continues  to  be covered in the media and on
political fora. Apart from numerous press articles, a documentary was made, and he made
live appearances through video-link at  conferences in Canada,  the World Technology
Summit 2014 in New York, and a hearing at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe (PACE).
2 In  contrast  to  what  many  might  believe,  the  media  does  not  always  pick-up  a
whistleblower story.  Whistleblowers  often have a  hard time getting journalists  to  be
interested  in  the  wrongdoing  they  disclose1.  Findings  from  the  World  Online
Whistleblowing Survey conducted by Professor AJ Brown showed those who had been
whistleblowers were the least likely group to believe whistleblowing to the media is a
good idea. Of the whistleblower who took part in the study, 13 per cent (more than double
that of the other groups and the general populations) considered that the whistle should
never  be  blown  to  the  media,  suggesting  that  many  whistleblowers  have  had  bad
experiences when going to the media, or found the route to be ineffective2.
3 Whistleblower  support  organizations  are  increasingly  networked  with  hand-picked
journalists, ranked according to topics-likely-to-cover and integrity of dealing with the
whistleblower, i.e. protection of sources and refraining from picturing the whistleblower
as a lunatic.  Snowden initially worked through three such trusted journalists - Glenn
Greenwald, Laura Poitras, and Even MacAskill - but the wider press quickly picked up on
his disclosures. An obvious reason for this is that what Snowden disclosed affects us all.
Most of us were shocked to learn our emails and what we read on the internet was being
monitored by a government agency. Not just in the US, but also in the UK and Germany
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and possibly elsewhere too. Then it daunted on us that what we put on Facebook is not
just visible to our ‘friends’. Our tweets are not just read by our ‘followers’ only. Moreover,
some of the apps on our smartphone store positioning data without us knowing and
without having any use whatsoever with why we downloaded the app for - flashlight for
example.  We  then  learned  that  social  media  companies  transfer  information  to
governments. We did not know why we had to be scared of this, but we were. Stories that
get all of us scared make headlines. Snowden’s disclosure ticked that box.
4 In  this  paper,  I  argue  that  whilst  the  possibility  of  whistleblowing  in  the  media  is
fundamental to all notions of whistleblowing, it largely remains a ‘broken promise’ of
whistleblowing  activism.  I  show how in  the  short  45  year  history  of  whistleblowing
activism, whistleblowing in the media has brought moments of hope for whistleblowers,
but that these moments were short-lived. I also suggest that we currently live another
such moment of hope.
5 The most  important  politician in  recent  years  pushing the  whistleblowing agenda is
perhaps Pieter Omtzigt. A Dutch pensions expert, he has been a member of the Dutch
Parliament since 2003, and a member of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe (PACE) since 2004. In 2010, as the rapporteur of the Committee for Legal Affairs
and Human Rights, he managed to get PACE to pass a resolution on the protection of
whistleblowers (PACE Resolution 1729 (2010)).  In July 2013,  he tabled a motion for a
recommendation on an “Additional  protocol  to  the  European Convention on Human
Rights on the protection of whistle-blowers who disclose governmental action violating
international law and fundamental rights” (PACE Doc. 13278 of 5 July 2013). Note the
combination of human rights, whistleblowing, and governmental wrongdoing. A month
earlier, June 2013, Edward Snowden had started his disclosures on NSA mass surveillance.
6 Omtzigt’s motion was trying to ride that momentum. However, the motion was never
discussed in the Assembly. He did however get something out of the attempt. He was
appointed in November 2013 as the rapporteur for two projects, mass surveillance on the
one hand and whistleblower protection on the other. The two streams were not allowed
to  merge.  There  was  already  a  resolution  on  whistleblower  protection ;  a  draft
recommendation was being developed after an expert meeting in Strasbourg in May 2013,
about one month before Snowden’s initial disclosures. Soon after this, the other track also
started to bear fruit : in April 2014, the European Parliament adopted Resolution on the
‘US  NSA  surveillance  programme,  surveillance  bodies  in  various  Member  States  and
impact on EU citizens' fundamental rights and on transatlantic cooperation in Justice and
Home Affairs’ (2013/2188 INI). It is not clear whether Omtzigt played a role in this. The
European Parliament comprises of elected politicians from the members states of the
European Union ; the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, where Omtzigt
has a seat, comprises of delegations of national parliamentarians from its 47 member
states (including EU countries but also Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, etc.).
7 In his report of January 2014, Omtzigt makes the case that Snowden combines the two
tracks ; that these are inherently intertwined3. He does so again in his report from March
2015  from  the  Committee  on  Legal  Affairs  and  Human  Rights4.  The  report  is  titled
“improving the protection of whistleblowers” rather than “additional protocol to the
ECHR on the protection of whistleblowers”. Whatever the intent behind the change in
title,  Omtzigt  draws  in  his  report  on  Snowden’s  case  to  argue  for  whistleblower
protection when public interest overrides national security mechanisms. Between these
two  reports,  in  April  2014,  the  Council  of  Europe’s  Committee  of  Ministers  adopted
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Recommendation (CM/Rec (2014)7) on the protection of whistleblowers. The 29 principles
of  the  recommendation  provide  an  excellent  framework  to  evaluate  any  national
whistleblowing regime around the world, and especially serves as a benchmark for the
Council of Europe’s 47 member states. Does it say anything about mass surveillance and
Snowden-like whistleblowing ? Not directly, but principle 5 makes allusions to national
security related whistleblowing : “A special scheme or rules, including modified rights
and  obligations,  may  apply  to  information  relating  to  national  security,  defence,
intelligence, public order or international relations of the State” (CM/Rec(2014)7). The
explanatory memorandum (CM(2014)34 add final),  confirms that “there are legitimate
reasons why member States may wish to apply a restricted set of rules in some or all of
the  cases  mentioned”,  but  it  stresses  that  “they  may  not  leave  the  whistleblower
completely without protection or a potential defence”.
8 Omtzigt’s “mass surveillance” track is taking a bit longer to materialize. In April 2015,
PACE adopted Resolution 2045(2015) on Mass Surveillance, urging the Council of Europe
member and observer States to adopt some restrictions on mass surveillance practices,
and inter alia to “provide credible, effective protection, including asylum, for whistle-
blowers who expose unlawful surveillance activities”. During the same session, PACE also
adopted Recommendation 2067(2015) on privacy. This does not mention whistleblowing
at all. The difference between a PACE Recommendation and Resolution is that the former
is addressed to the Committee of Ministers and for which the implementation is within
the competence of governments. A Resolution however, is an expression of view by the
Assembly for which it alone is responsible. It is telling that the document linking human
rights and whistleblowing is  a  resolution and thus has of  yet  very little  potential  to
impact national law.
9 My point in this paper is that the recent unfolding of whistleblower protection led by
Pieter Omtzigt is history repeating itself. At the end of the 20th century debates in many
countries  on  whistleblower  protection  were  initially  framed  in  terms  of  protecting
freedom of expression ; whistleblowing was a human right that had to be protected. None
of  these  discourses  was  maintained.  Just  like  Omtzigt  had  to  separately  pursue  the
whistleblowing and the mass surveillance projects. Whistleblower protection laws came
about  through  an  anti-corruption  agenda,  not  a  human  rights  one.  A  paradox  of
whistleblower protection is that free speech drove it but was irrelevant in bringing it
home. I elaborate on this in the next section.
10 However, something has gone missing along the way. The whistleblower protections in
many  countries  are  able  to  deal  with  some  issues  of  fraud,  corruption,  and  other
wrongdoing, but not with the cases that would trigger everyone’s fears.  They do not
recognize the fundamental human right of freedom of expression when the public needs
to be warned in cases where those who rule us breach human rights. I also elaborate on
this in a section in this paper.
11 The point and the paradox is this : because the freedom of expression element is missing,
there remains whistleblowing that causes scandal ; there remains whistleblowing for
which there are no adequate institutional arrangements. Snowden’s whistleblowing is an
example of that. But so are Wikileaks, Globaleaks, Indoleaks, Scienceleaks, Magyarleaks,
Ruleaks, Unileaks, and many other ‘leak’-sites that have sprung up since 2007. Hence free
speech initially drove whistleblowing protection, and whilst it has been irrelevant for
establishing  whistleblowing  protection,  free  speech  is  still  driving  whistleblower
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protection. This paper closes with a section explaining this continued yet altered drive.
History repeats itself, but each time in a slightly different way.
 
I- Whistleblowing as a Human Right
12 Article 19 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights states :
13 “Everyone  has  the  right  to  freedom  of  opinion  and  expression ;  this  right  includes
freedom  to  hold  opinions  without  interference  and  to  seek,  receive  and  impart
information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.”
14 A whistleblower speaks out - although he or she sometimes writes - an evaluation of a
situation. In doing so, they pass on information. That information may be warnings of
risky practices,  accusations of  illegalities  or inappropriate diligence,  or expression of
concern. Hence, whistleblowing prima facie falls under this right to freedom of opinion
and expression. However, not everything is said with that. What kinds of qualifications
need to be considered, e.g. whistleblowing happens in the context of work relationships,
not simply in a citizenship context. If Article 19 holds, in spite of the specifics of work
relationships, then that necessitates whistleblower protection, since Article 28 of that
same Declaration states :
15 “Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms
set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.”
16 The UN Declaration of 1948 was a response to the atrocities of and prior to the Second
World War, and was addressed to national governments. In this sense, its aim was to
identify inalienable rights to individuals which they can claim on their governments.
Indeed,  nation  states  have  written  the  Declaration  into  their  constitution,  thereby
accepting it  as  their  duty to  respect,  protect  and even realize  human rights.  Hence,
responsibilities concerning human rights have historically been located within national
governments. However, more recent history has shown that 1) national governments are
not the sole perpetrators of human rights, thus private organizations also have the duty
to  respect ;  2)  national  governments  are  not  alone  in  having  an  ability  to  ensure
individuals can claim their human rights, thus private organizations also have duties to
protect ;  and  3)  not  only  national  governments  have  the  means  to  realize  societal
conditions allowing individuals to enjoy their human rights, thus private organization too
have duties to realize human rights. The most obvious examples of this are in the area of
supply chain responsibilities, and Professor John Ruggie has made considerable way in
writing policy and regulation on this. Between 2005 and 2011, Ruggie was the UN Special
Representative of the Secretary-General on human rights and transnational corporations
and other  business  enterprises.  He  developed the  UN ‘Protect,  Respect  and Remedy’
Framework, which the UN Human Rights Council endorsed in 2011 (A/HRC/RES/17/4).
This  framework  has  been  implemented  into  the  OECD Guidelines  for  MNCs  and  ISO
standards. There is nothing on whistleblowing in there, but the development shows an
acknowledgment that private legal entities also have human rights responsibilities.
17 Crucial to the Declaration of Human Rights is that these rights cannot be interpreted
separately. A right cannot be claimed by a person, group, or state if exercising that right
would  imply  the  violation  of  the  rights  of  others  (Article  30).  Moreover,  the  UN
Declaration also stipulates in Article 29 that one has “duties to the community in which
alone the free and full development of his personality is possible”, and that the exercise
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of the rights and freedoms is subject to limitations necessary for the public order and the
general welfare in a democratic society. The UN Declaration has been reiterated a number
of times, and each time also its qualifications (or limitations). The European Convention
on Human Rights (1950) has Article 10 :
18 “Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to
hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by
public authority and regardless of frontiers.”
19 It also has the limitations that ‘This article shall not prevent States from requiring the
licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises’, and more importantly :
20 “The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with its duties and responsibilities may
be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by
law  and  are  necessary  in  a  democratic  society,  in  the  interest  of  national  security,
territorial  integrity or public safety,  for the prevention of  disorder or crime,  for the
protection of  health or  morals,  for  the protection of  the reputation or  the rights  of
others,  for  preventing  the  disclosure  of  information  received  in  confidence,  or
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.”
21 The American Convention on Human Rights (1969) has Article 13 :
22 “Everyone  has  the  right to  freedom  of  thought  and  expression.  This  right  includes
freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of
frontiers,  either orally,  in writing,  in print,  in the form of art,  or through any other
medium of one’s choice.”
23 And with the limitations :
24 “The exercise of the right provided for in the foregoing paragraph shall not be subject to
prior censorship but shall be subject to subsequent imposition of liability, which shall be
expressly established by law to the extent necessary to ensure : a) respect for the rights
or reputations of others ; or b) the protection of national security, public order, or public
health or morals. […] The right of expression may not be restricted by indirect methods
or  means,  such  as  the  abuse  of  government  or  private  controls  of  newsprint,  radio
broadcasting frequencies, or equipment used in the dissemination of information, or by
any other means tending to impede the communication and circulation of  ideas and
opinions.”
25 The Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Right (1981) has Article 12 :
26 “Every person has the right to express his thoughts and belief so long as he remains
within the limits  prescribed by the Law.  No one,  however,  is  entitled to disseminate
falsehood or to circulate reports which may outrage public decency, or to indulge in
slander,  innuendo or  to  cast  defamatory aspersions on other  persons.  […]  Pursuit  of
knowledge and search after truth is not only a right but a duty of every Muslim. It is the
right and duty of every Muslim to protest and strive (within the limits set out by the Law)
against oppression even if it involves challenging the highest authority in the state. There
shall be no bar on the dissemination of information provided it does not endanger the
security of the society or the state and is confined within the limits imposed by the Law.”
27 All of these acknowledge freedom to receive and impart information, but this freedom is
restricted by notions of national security and public order. This qualification makes the
absoluteness and universality of human rights quite arbitrary, as blowing the whistle on
those who rule, or those to whom work is subcontracted is quite likely to have effects that
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destabilize the public (perception of) order, and might very well involve disclosure of
information that is qualified as national secret.
28 However,  Tom  Campbell5 argues  that  these  claims  are  ‘a  way  of  getting  at  a  more
substantive matter, namely the claimed universal value of human existence, or what may
be called the idea of equal human worth’. Hence, the point of reference for interpreting
the adequate scope and applicability of human rights is the equal worth of human beings,
a value that is closely tied to the notion of human dignity and the Kantian concept of
people being ends in themselves. Thus the human rights discourse emphasizes the high
moral status of any human being, and ‘a human right is held to be a right that protects or
furthers human dignity in very important ways’6. The implication is that a right can be a
human right even if it is subject to many qualifications. Moreover, Campbell argues that a
human right can be either intrinsic or instrumental. An intrinsic right is a right to do or
have things that are worthwhile in themselves, like the right to life. An instrumental
right is a right of which the value lies in the causal relationship to intrinsic rights. The
value of an instrumental right varies with its effectiveness in protecting or furthering
intrinsic rights. Campbell mentions three ‘free speech rationales’, or three ways to argue
for workplace free speech as a human right : 1) the argument for truth, 2) the argument
for self-expression, and 3) the argument for democracy. The argument for truth posits
workplace free speech as an instrumental human right. The existence and spread of true
belief in society or community is the intrinsic good to which free speech rights are the
instrument.  That would also go for organizations,  where the spread of  ‘true belief’  -
besides its intrinsic value - is itself instrumental for efficiency. The argument for self-
expression sees workplace free speech as an intrinsic right, necessary in order to respect
human dignity and moral worth. As Campbell7 puts it :
29 “If self-expression is an important human need and is essential to the flourishing of the
individuals as moral, rational and creative beings, then we have something that is clearly
universal, intrinsic and important. Further, to prevent such self-expressive activity may
be  deemed  a  violation  of  a  person’s  humanity,  […]  which  denies  them  dignity  and
suppresses their individuality.”
30 The third argument is again instrumental, based on the role of political free speech in
democracy. How does this apply to organizations ? Political free speech rights are a way
of protecting the individual interests against officialdom : the role of free speech and
information  sharing  in  making  demands  and  influencing  decisions.  Such  role  is
instrumental  to  democracy,  but  could  also  be  applied  to  private  organizations  even
though no elections are held8. Democracy can also be understood as a process - one of
dialogue  as  a  way  to  reach  consensus  on  matters  of  common  concern.  That  too  is
applicable to organizations.
31 The point is that whistleblowing as a human right is always an affirmation of individual
human  dignity  (self-expression),  either  directly  and  explicitly,  or  indirectly  as  an
instrument to such affirmation (truth and democracy). The implication for whistleblower
protection policy is that there would be no restrictions on the kind of relationships
within which free speech whistleblowing is protected, and no restrictions on the type of
concern that would qualify as protected. In terms of who the whistle is blown to, this may
be qualified for the sake of public order and mistaken concerns but must allow for public
speech at some point,  i.e.  a 3-tiered whistleblowing regime9 .  By the end of the 20th
century, discussions in a number of countries had been using the human rights argument.
I will give three examples : the USA, South Africa, and the Netherlands. In each of these,
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whistleblowing as a human right, closely tied to the notion of freedom of expression and
its  implications  which I  have  just  argued,  goes  out  the  window when whistleblower
protection eventually gets enacted.
32 In a 1975 comment in Harvard Business Review entitled ‘Your employees’ right to blow
the  whistle’,  Walters10 (1975)  expects  that  matters  traditionally  considered  an
organization’s ‘own business’ might become the public’s as well. More precisely, Walters
spotted legal trends that whistleblowers ‘in private organizations are steadily gaining
legal  support  and  may  someday  enjoy  essentially  the  same  rights  as  employees  in
government organizations’11 (Walters 1975 : 27). He mentions a number of court rulings
that  made  reference  to  free  speech  protection  and  the  USA  First  Amendment.12
Arguments used in those rulings use rationales of truth and democracy13, and include : 1)
that free and open debate is vital to informed decision making, 2) that it is essential that
members of a community most likely to have informed opinions about how to spend
funds, are able to speak freely on such issues without fear of retaliatory dismissal, and 3)
that some critics are engaging in precisely the sort of free and vigorous expression that
the  First  Amendment  was  designed  to  protect.  Walters  quotes  Emerson,  a  First
Amendment scholar,  to argue that free speech based arguments are driving the USA
towards whistleblowing policies :
33 “A system of freedom of expression that allowed private bureaucracies to throttle all
internal discussion of their affairs would be seriously deficient. There seems to be general
agreement that at some point the government must step in.  In any event the law is
moving steadily in that direction (Emerson 1970, cited in Walters 1975 : 34)14.”
34 In 1977 GAP (Government Accountability  Project)  was founded in Washington,  DC.  It
became one of the world leading whistleblower organizations, advocating free speech,
litigating whistleblower cases, publicizing whistleblower concerns, developing policy and
advising on legal reforms. To this day, Tom Devine and Bea Edwards still use arguments
emphasizing occupational  free speech,  human rights  and the First  Amendment.  That
same year,  the US Senate established a Special  Committee  on Governmental  Affairs.  Jimi
Carter had become President of the USA, and the Watergate scandal had put civil service
reform high on the agenda. A year later, in 1978 the Committee issued its report15. This
lead  to  the  passing  of  the  Civil  Service  Reform Act which  included  protection  against
reprisal for civil servants. One of the agencies the Act created for this was the Office of
Special Counsel (OSC). However, between 1979 and 1988 the OSC turned down more than
90 % of cases referred to it16. It just did not function. In 1989, the Whistleblower Protection
Act (WPA) was passed to improve the effectiveness of the OSC and to increase protection
for  federal  whistleblowers,  allowing them to  appeal  to  the  Merit  Systems Protection
Board if the OSC did not seek corrective action on their behalf. The WPA was amended in
1994. The onus of proof for reprisals remained on the whistleblower. However, federal
employees  no  longer  had to  show that  their  whistleblowing was  a  significant  factor
causing the reprisal, but merely a contributing one.
35 Whereas in 1978 Congress had answered the desire for open decision making and the
recognition that civil servants had a potential for public responsibility as individuals17,
these normative appeals of the 1970s had shifted during the 1980s and 1990s. Groeneweg18
argues that the structure of the internal mechanisms for reporting under the WPA shows
whistleblowing as an efficiency tool rather than provide a mechanism for the protection
of  government  employees  who  disclose  on  corrupt  practices.  By  1993  this  turn  in
discourse  seems  completed.  Groeneweg19 cites  the  opening  letter  of  the  1993  MSPB
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report,  in  which  the  chairman  and  the  vice-chairman  state  their  position  on
whistleblowing :
36 “Obviously, if meeting the current goals to improve Government operations is going to
depend significantly on employee reporting of information about fraud, waste and abuse,
employees will need to be more willing to do this now than they were in 1983.”
37 The ideal of whistleblowing has now become efficiency. The focus of designing or revising
whistleblowing policies then, is not to make protection better, but to get information
from employees. Dworkin and Near20 note the same shift. They write that whereas the
‘old’ model valued motivation over information and viewed whistleblowing as an act of
conscience and responsibility, the ‘new’ model values information over motivation.
38 In South Africa, whistleblower protection legislation was developed and enacted as part
of  a democratization process in an attempt to deal  with the historical  weight of  the
Apartheid regime. Only in 1994 did the country hold its first democratic elections. These
were  the  beginnings  of  transformations  of  government  with  an  aspiration  for  a
participative democracy. In 1995, provisions to protect whistleblowers was part of the
first draft of the Open Democracy Bill. A second draft from 1997 published as ‘general
notice 1514’ also protected whistleblowing to ‘one or more news media and on clear and
convincing grounds’ - a qualified but open ended recipient. It would also protect ‘any
person’. So far so good. But the new Constitution had been called in on 4 February 1997
and specified a constitutional deadline of three years (Section 21-4) to enact legislation
prescribing a framework for the government procurement policy for the allocation of
contracts and the protection or advancement of persons. Thus the Open Democracy Bill
had to be voted before 4 February 2000.
39 The Institute for Security Studies, and more precisely Lala Camerer succeeded in 1999 -
there was little time left  -  in convincing the Justice Committee to split  up the Open
Democracy Bill into the Promotion of Access to Information Bill, on the one hand, and the
Protected Disclosure Bill, on the other21 (Camerer 2001, Dimba et al 2004). The Protected
Disclosures Act (PDA) was eventually passed mid 2000 (Protected Disclosures Act, No 26
(2000), published in the Government Gazette on 7 August 2000). Although the PDA makes
reference  in  its  preamble  to  ‘the  democratic  values  of  human  dignity,  equality  and
freedom’, a peculiarity in the PDA suggests this reference is only rhetorical. It covers both
public and private sector, but only whistleblowers in an employer-employee relationship.
Contractors or volunteers are not covered. In an era of outsourcing and subcontracting,
this is a strange twist and an acknowledged flaw in the South African PDA22 (Dimba et al
2004, ODAC 2003). Of the two Acts into which the Open Democracy Bill was split, it is the
Access to Information Act that represents the human rights focus. Access to information
is  a  human  right  and  hence  the  Act  allows  people  to  exercise  their  human  rights.
Whistleblowing  on  the  other  hand,  is  a  tool  to  tackle  fraud.  Since  2002,  the  King
Committee  on  Corporate  Governance  rationalized  whistleblowing  further  into  an
instrument improving efficiency23 (Vandekerckhove 2006).
40 In  the  Netherlands,  Mark  Bovens  influenced  the  conceptual  tinkering  around
whistleblowing in the early 1990s. Bovens wrote in Dutch and introduced the translation
of ‘whistleblower’ as ‘bell-ringer’ (klokkenluider) - a person sounding the church-bells -
which is still the standard term. Now, a person sounding the church-bells is someone
calling for the attention of his/her community. A church is a refuge, a safe place. Bovens’
term points at the need to protect those who sound the alarm or raise concern to their
community.  Bovens  continued  to  be  an  influential  scholar  in  the  field  of  public
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accountability,  democracy  and  citizenship,  and  political  trust.  The  rationale  for  a
whistleblowing policy he sketched was based on the notion of institutional citizenship (
institutioneel burgerschap). Bovens emphasized that an official or employee is, even within
the context of the organization, always a citizen. In 1993, the then Minister of Home
Affairs  Ien  Dales  started  a  discussion  about  renewing  public  sector  governance,
emphasizing integrity.
41 Five  years  later,  Paul  Van  Buitenen,  a  Dutch  auditor  working  for  the  European
Commission, blew the whistle on corruption by a Commissioner, which led a year later, in
1999 to the resignation of the whole European Commission24. The same year, the Dutch
Ministry  of  Home  Affairs  published  a  report  making  recommendations  on  how  to
strengthen  integrity  in  government25.  The  first  chapter  in  that  report  is  about
whistleblowing. The report states that external whistleblowing has undesirable effects. It
undermines trust in the department and internal relationships are damaged. Hence, the
meaning of whistleblower or klokkenluider as Bovens introduced it in the Netherlands was
completely hollowed out.  In a classic  example of  double speak,  Bovens’  ‘institutional
citizenship’ is turned upside down with references to ‘fulfilling the duties of the office’
and  secrecy  provisions.  The  whistleblowing  policy  the  report  proposes26 is  a  mere
expansion  of  the  old  civil  servants’  duty  to  report  criminal  matters  to  the  Public
Prosecutor. It foresaw an independent commission, ideally comprised of a president, a
trustee  of  employees,  and  a  trustee  of  employers,  all  retired  politicians,  judges,  or
academics.  This  commission  could  only  publish  anonymized  advice  on  cases.  Public
whistleblowing was cut  short.  In 2000,  the FNV (Federatie  Nederlandse  Vakbewegingen -
Federation  of  Dutch  Unions)  made  an  attempt  to  correct  this.  The  FNV  proposal
emphasized freedom of expression as an intrinsic right to be respected in the workplace,
as workplace free speech furthers both the self-realization of the individual as well as
democracy.  Public  interest  overrides  secrecy  provisions.  Alas,  in  2002  the  city  of
Amsterdam ran its own whistleblowing policy, using the 1999 report as its blue print.
Reporting was a duty and all recipients were mandated and reported to the executive city
council. There was no external channel. In 2003, I participated in a meeting of ethicists in
Utrecht. Mark Bovens criticized this policy arguing that there was no accountability is
such a scheme. When asked if he wasn’t pleased to finally see what he had called for being
realized, Bovens replied that this was not at all what he had called for.
 
II- Media Whistleblowing and National Security
42 At  the  start  of  the  21st  century,  William  De  Maria  from  the  Centre  for  Public
Administration, University of Queensland, was shocked to see governments of countries
with no history or tradition of democracy prepare to legislate whistleblowing schemes.
His  core argument was that  ‘core infrastructural  prerequisites  needed to be in place
before the enactment of disclosure statutes’27. Countries with whistleblower protection
legislation (and a history of democracy) would be advising other countries without a
tradition of such ‘core infrastructures’, and De Maria feared ‘the worst’ for what would
happen. His fears were based on his analysis of whistleblower protections precisely in
countries with a tradition of democracy. For even in those countries, De Maria claims,
‘whistleblowing laws have been born in the house of secrecy’28. He points at a dialectic
relation between whistleblowing and secrecy.  Secrecy ‘needs’  -  in the sense of  being
maintained by -  whistleblowing to moderate public anger about official  concealment,
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control perceptions of organizations, and maintain preferred hierarchies of power. On
the other hand, whistleblowing ‘needs’ secrecy because :
43 “[...]destroying it is its single “raison d’être”. Curiously every “win” for a whistleblower is
a  triple-win for  secrecy.  A whistleblower win (typically  a  powerful  disclosure that  is
received well in the media and pushes officialdom to at least a promise of reform) is
thrice  reaped  by  the  state  as  a  public  relations  exercise.  The  State  reframes  the
whistleblowing as evidence of openness. A whistleblower win captures the imagination. It
is  a  story  of  David  winning  over  Goliath.  The  next  day  David  is  inducted  into  the
whistleblower hall of fame, we feel good, and Goliath quietly shambles on”29.
44 One of the core features of an effective whistleblower scheme for De Maria is protection
for media whistleblowers. In the last decade, whistleblower legislation has moved in the
direction of De Maria’s worst fears. The Malaysian Whistleblower Protection Act 2010 (Act
711) has many good features, e.g. reversal of burden of proof, possibility of interim relief,
etc. It also includes a solid provision for keeping the whistleblower’s identity confidential,
even  during  court  proceedings.  In  fact,  the  provisions  are  so  strong  not  even  the
whistleblower can disclose the information beyond their disclosure to an enforcement
agency :
45 “Any person who makes or receives a disclosure of improper conduct […] shall not disclose
the confidential information or any part thereof (Art 8(1)) (emphasis added).”
46 This  effectively  makes  whistleblowing to  third parties  punishable  by a  fine of  up to
RM50,000 and imprisonment of up to 10 years. What further complicates whistleblowing
is the scope of what is deemed as confidential - or official secret - namely any information
gained from government sources, the disclosure of which is punishable under the Official
Secrets Act 1972 by one to seven years of imprisonment. Lim Guan Eng, the Chief Minister
of Penang, said that ‘the WPA unfortunately appears to be the product of the old mindset
in this country that values secrecy above everything else’30.
47 The Netherlands has seen a number of regulations and initiatives to protect and support
whistleblowers, like the integrity office (Bureau Integriteit) for Amsterdam in 2001, the
Bureau  for Improving  Integrity  in  Public  Sector  (BIOS  -  Bureau  Integriteitsbevordering
Openbare Sector) in 2006, the Advice Centre for Whistleblowers (Adviespunt Klokkenluiders)
in  2012.  There  has  also  been  a  concurrent  reiteration  over  an  all-encompassing
whistleblower law. It took almost 15 years with draft bills going in all kinds of directions,
but in 2015 the law was finally passed through parliament. The legislation creates an
agency - House of the Whistleblower - that focuses more on investigating wrongdoing
than on protecting whistleblowers - e.g. there is no reversal of burden of proof - but it
covers  both  public  and  private  sector  wrongdoing.  Because  previous  bills  had  been
criticized for being unconstitutional, the Council of State was asked to give advice on
later versions of the bill, in an attempt to pre-empt further filibustering. In the advice
from the Council of State (30 January 2015, No.W04.14.0469/I) just before the bill was
enacted, there is a striking peculiarity. The Council of State writes :
48 “The Explanatory Memorandum discusses the question in which cases and under what
conditions  the  employee externally  discloses  wrongdoing.  Reference  is  made  to  a
document from the Labour Foundation. The Council of State points out that the question
of external disclosures poses itself differently once the House of the Whistleblower is
established through this law. A whistleblower who has the right to make an external
disclosure can do this with the House of the Whistleblower, and thus no longer has any
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ground  to  approach  the  media.  The  Council  advises  to  make  this  explicit  in the
Explanatory Memorandum.31”
49 What  this  ‘advice’  suggests  is  that  in  the  name  of  the  constitution,  whistleblower
protection and arrangements are ways of keeping whistleblowers out of public sight. Or
in William De Maria’s words ‘whistleblowing laws have been born in the house of secrecy’
32.  Of  course,  these  provisions  can  be  read  in  a  way  that  is  more  favourable  for
whistleblowers. But without some pattern of favourable interpretations in tricky cases,
we can only note, question and - with De Maria - worry about the absence of a route to
protected media whistleblowing.
50 In the USA, the last decade has seen increasing criminalization of whistleblowing under
the Espionage Act33 (Radack and McClellan 2011). In 2005, the New York Times published a
story disclosing NSA’s domestic spying programme - this was eight years before Snowden.
Bush called this ‘a shameful act for someone to disclose this very important program in a
time of war’34. The DOJ prosecuted - and continued to do so under Obama - both the New
York Times and the leakers, with large-scale investigations into the sources of the article,
issuing subpoenas for over 50 individuals. Among those whose houses were raided were
whistleblowers who had previously raised their concern through the prescribed internal
channels.
51 Before Obama became President of the USA he had been siding with whistleblowers on a
number of occasions35. Strengthening protections for whistleblowers was even part of his
plan to reinvigorate ethics in government. Moberly writes that Obama has lived up to
that promise in many respects. However, Moberly also notes
52 “President  Obama’s  seemingly  contradictory  approach  to  whistleblowers  and  the
distinction he appears to draw between whistleblowing about governmental misconduct
generally, which he supports, and whistleblowing in the national security context, which
he appears to disdain36".
53 The Omnibus Appropriations Act 2009 included a provision preventing any federal officer
to prohibit or prevent communications between other federal employees and Congress
(Section 714 Division D). In a signing statement to this bill, Obama wrote that he did ‘not
interpret this provision to detract from [his] authority to direct the heads of executive
departments  to  supervise,  control,  and  correct  employees’  communications  with  the
Congress  in  cases  where  such  communications  would  be  unlawful  or  would  reveal
information that is properly privileged or otherwise confidential’ (Signing Statement for
H.R. 1105, P.L. 111-8). In other words, whistleblowing to Congress about the executive
branch is protected unless the executive branch does not want it. Moberly37 also gives a
detailed account of how whistleblowing protection was weakened for national security
whistleblowers, in the turning around of H.R. 985 and H.R. 1507 into S. 372).
54 When it  comes to allowing journalists  to protect the confidentiality of  their sources,
Obama not only demands that exceptions exist to require a journalist to reveal their
source’s identity, but also insists that ‘judges defer to the executive branch’s judgment on
whether  national  security  would  be  affected’38.  Indeed,  making  national  security
exceptions to free speech becomes really dangerous when those protecting secrecy also
have a mandate to decide what is to be kept secret. Or, as Moberly39 writes : ‘To put it
bluntly, when it comes to national security, Obama would rather protect secrecy than
protect whistleblowing’.
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55 At the outset of this paper, I argued that whistleblowing as a human right would allow
policies to have a qualified recipient, i.e. a specification of preferred channels, but must
also include an option to go public at one point or another. We can see that, in the Council
of Europe Recommendation, where a 3-tiered recipient is put forward : internal to the
organization, external to a regulator or enforcement agency, and public through media or
third parties. However, this is not what seems to be happening. The examples I gave are
of policies that indeed strengthen whistleblowers’ position at the first two tiers - internal
and  to  an  enforcement  agency  -  but  effectively  cut  off  access  to  public  or  media
whistleblowing. Increased whistleblowing modalities come with an increase in imposed
secrecy.  Sometimes,  this  hides  in the conditions for  protection,  other  times national
security serves as an explicit exception to freedom of expression. Both are instances of
double-speak.
 
III- Whistleblowing as a Human Right Revisited
56 The  aspiration  to  make  freedom  of  expression  an  acknowledged  right  drove  the
movement for whistleblower protection. Yet the protection we have seen come about
puts a lid on that freedom. As I have shown with examples from the end of the 1990s, this
is not something that happened in the last decade alone. In my book from 2006, I argue
that this trend away from whistleblowing as a human right is a subjectivating one40. My
conclusion was that :
57 “[...]  even though whistleblowing policies  are necessary,  they are ethical  only to the
extent that they succeed in protecting individuality rather than institutionalizing the
individual”41.
58 The individual is reduced to an employee, which becomes the institution for integrating
organization and society,  economic and social  concerns.  There is  acknowledgment of
wrongdoing, but only at the level of workers. That - organizations as structures might be
dysfunctional  or  harmful  for  society  -  is  neglected.  The  assumption  is  that  when
organizations know of wrongdoing - by employees blowing the whistle internally or to a
regulator -  they can and must  correct  it.  Thus the individual  becomes enclosed -  or
trapped - inside the organization.
59 I  contrasted  this  subjectivation  (Foucault)  with  subject  affirmation  (Touraine).  For
Touraine - one of the first French intellectuals to support the campaign in 2014 to give
Edward Snowden asylum in France -, the subject is an individual who wants to be an
actor, who wants to reshape the social. Subject affirmation is a political notion. It denotes
an  individual  who  does  not  succumb  blindly  to  authority  and  imposed  goals  or
rationalities but rather engages with these to make a structural change. For Touraine, the
extreme  form  of  the  subject  is  the  dissident.  He  might  as  well  have  written  ‘the
whistleblower’,  in  particular  whistleblowers  who  make  several  attempts  and  finally
disclose  to  the  media.  Snowden  has  made  it  undeniable  that  the  whistleblower
protections we have seen emerging since 1978 fall short of what was hoped for. In a sense,
he represents a renewed hope for whistleblowing as a human right. Yet he is not alone.
There are other instances of such a renewed hope.
60 One of these is the growing jurisprudence from the European Court of Human Rights on
whistleblowing cases brought under Article 10 (freedom of expression) of the European
Convention on Human Rights.  Its  first  case in that  respect  dates  from 2008 (Guja vs
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Moldova, Application No. 14277/04). A public official had sent two letters from politicians
exerting pressure on courts to the press and was sacked for doing so. The ECtHR sided
with the whistleblower. Another important case is Bucur and Toma vs Romania in 2013
(Application No. 40238/02), where a worker of the Romanian Intelligence Service (RIS)
blew the whistle by holding a press conference that the RIS had unlawfully tapped the
phones of journalists, politicians, and businessmen. Romanian courts had convicted the
whistleblower  for  breach  of  official  secrecy.  The  EctHR,  however,  found  that  this
conviction  breached  the  whistleblower’s  right  to  freedom  of  expression  as  the
prosecution was not ‘necessary in a democratic society’.
61 Another instance of renewed hope - and human rights drive - for whistleblowing can be
found in the Tshwane Principles (2013), a set of 50 principles which the Open Society
Justice Initiative currently promotes as the ‘Global Principles on National Security and
the Right to Information’. Principles 37-42 and 46 are explicit calls for the protection of
whistleblowers  disclosing  information  about  wrongdoing  even  if  that  information  is
classified or otherwise confidential.  Principle 40 in particular calls  for protection for
public whistleblowing. The other principles are relevant as well for the current trend in
whistleblowing policies. The Tshwane Principles are an attempt to establish a benchmark
on what can legitimately be a national security issue. They embody a call to do away with
the  recent  trend  of  over  classification  and  provisions  that  allow  ad  hoc  tagging  of
anything sensitive as national security.
62 Pieter  Omtzigt  mentions  the  Tshwane principles  in  his  report  from January  2015  as
rapporteur of Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights42. In that report, he calls for
the Council of Europe to 1) enact whistleblower protection laws also covering employees
of national security or intelligence services and of private firms working in this field, 2)
grant asylum to whistleblowers threatened by retaliation in their  home countries,  3)
establish a binding legal  instrument on whistleblower protection on the bases of  the
Council of Europe Recommendation (2014(7)), and 4) for the USA (which has observer
status membership of the Council of Europe) to allow Snowden to return without fear of
criminal prosecution and allowing him to raise the public interest defence.
63 However,  the route to the European Court  of  Human Rights is  a  very long one ;  the
Tshwane Principles are sound but it is an uphill battle to get policy makers to recognize
them  as  a  benchmark ;  Omtzigt’s  endeavours  are  promising  but  might  not  get
implemented before he needs to vacate his political seat. All of this is promising, but we
have seen promising things before that did not turn out how we hoped they would. Is
there anything concrete and happening right now on the ground ? After all, it was the ‘on
the  ground’  campaigning  of  Ralph  Nader  in  the  early  1970s  that  started  the
whistleblowing movement.
64 Two things happening now are unprecedented for whistleblowing, and have been hugely
important. Although, I will not provide a full analysis of these in this paper, I do want to
mention them as vehicles of that renewed hope for whistleblowing as a human right. One
phenomenon is the emergence of whistleblower support groups. During the 1980s, there
was GAP (Government Accountability Project) in the USA. That was it - worldwide. In the
1990s there were a handful, including PCaW (Public Concern at Work) in the UK, ODAC
(Open Democracy Advice Centre) in South Africa,  and PISA (Public Interest Speak-Up
Advisors) in Japan. Today, there are such groups in more than 15 countries, and, in many
countries, there is more than one. These groups vary widely in how they are organized
and what they specialize in : whistleblower led self-help groups, organizations offering
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advice  to  whistleblowers,  lobbying  and  campaigning  groups,  psychological  support
groups, and organizations offering legal support for whistleblowers. These groups keep
whistleblowing on the public agenda, continue to stress the importance for society of
freedom of expression as speaking ‘truth to power’, educate mass media journalists on
whistleblowing, point at loopholes in legislation, and stand together with whistleblowers.
They  are  now also  networked  through  WIN (Whistleblowing  International  Network),
which gives them credibility and voice no matter how small they are in their respective
countries.
65 The second ‘on the ground’ phenomenon are the leaks sites. Wikileaks was the first to
start  around  2007.  In  2010  Wikileaks  started  publishing  classified  US  military  and
diplomatic documents leaked by Chelsea Manning, which triggered a witch hunt. The
Obama administration added Wikileaks to the list of enemies that threatened US Security.
When Assange got into trouble in 2012, the excitement and know-how for this activism
had already spread.  There  was  a  mushrooming of  leaks  sites :  Globaleaks,  Indoleaks,
Scienceleaks, Magyarleaks, Ruleaks, Unileaks, etc. It hardly makes a difference if one gets
closed down. New ones pop up all the time. The importance of leaks sites is that it makes
disclosure easy. It does not necessarily mean that people will want to disclose information
quicker or earlier in their whistleblowing process but once they come to the stage that
they want to, they can.
66 It is precisely the technological and practical ease of doing so that is taking the secrecy lid
off  of  whistleblowing  again.  It  scares  the  hell  out  of  everyone  in  control  of  an
organization - public and private. Simply because it puts a limit on their control over
secrecy. Managers and officials now cannot but understand that if they fail to listen, the
whistle will be blown elsewhere. Of course, blowing the whistle through a leaks site might
not be the most effective way to do it, but then again, effectiveness was never a criterion
for hope, including hope for free speech.
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ABSTRACTS
The recent unfolding of whistleblower protection is history repeating itself. At the end of the
20th century, debates in many countries on whistleblower protection were initially framed in
terms of protecting freedom of expression ; whistleblowing was a human right that had to be
protected. None of these discourses was maintained. Hence, Whistleblower protection laws came
about through an anti-corruption agenda, not a human rights one. A paradox of whistleblower
protection is that free speech drove it but was irrelevant in bringing it home. Because of that, the
whistleblower  protections  in  many  countries  are  able  to  deal  with  some  issues  of  fraud,
corruption,  and  other  wrongdoing,  but  do  not  recognise  the  fundamental  human  right  of
freedom of expression when the public needs to be warned in cases where those who rule us
breach human rights. And, because the freedom of expression element is missing, there remains
whistleblowing  that  causes  scandal ;  there  remains  whistleblowing  for  which  there  are  no
adequate institutional arrangements.
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Le  développement  d'une nouvelle  préoccupation  pour  la  protection  des  lanceurs  d'alerte
démontre que l'histoire se répète. A la fin du vingtième siècle, les débats autour de la protection
des lanceurs d'alerte dans de nombreux états étaient envisagés sous l'angle de la protection du
droit de l'homme à la liberté d'expression ; le lancement d'alerte était un droit de l'homme qui
devait, à ce titre, bénéficier d'une protection. Aucun de ces discours n'a réellement prospéré. Par
conséquent,  les  lois  de  protection  des  lanceurs  d'alerte  ont  été  adoptées  dans  le  cadre  de
politiques de lutte contre la corruption, et non pas dans un élan visant à protéger les droits
humains. Le paradoxe de la protection des lanceurs d'alerte est le suivant : la liberté d'expression
a constitué le point de départ de la préoccupation de protéger les lanceurs d'alerte, mais n'a pas
réussi à ériger le lancement d'alerte en composante à part entière d'un droit de l'Homme. Par
conséquent, les lois de protection des lanceurs d'alerte reconnaissent la légitimité du lancement
d'alerte dans les hypothèses de fraude, de corruption et d'autres mauvaises pratiques, mais ne
reconnaissent que trop peu le droit à la liberté d'expression dans les hypothèses où le public doit
être alerté des violations des droits humains commises par les gouvernants. Et c'est précisément
parce que la liberté d'expression apparaît comme le chaînon manquant de l'alerte que certaines
affaires de lancement d'alerte (Wikileaks, Luxleaks, révélations Snowden...) continuent de faire
scandale  car  il  s'agit  de  variantes  de  lancement  d'alerte  pour  lesquelles  aucun encadrement
juridique n'a été mis en place.
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